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Constitutionalizing “Authoritarian Liberalism”  
in the Philippines: 
A Critique of the Political Economy of Charter Change* 
 
Bonn Juego 
 
 
A deeper logic underlies President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Consultative 
Commission’s Proposed Revision of the 1987 Constitution launched in late 
2005, the so-called Charter Change project. Its proposals provide for the 
fundamental institutional ensemble, with constitutional effect, that guarantees 
the global and domestic rights of capital. At the heart of this project is an effort 
to mobilize support for the constitutionalization of “authoritarian liberalism” as 
the de facto state form. In doing so, it seeks the promotion of a (neo)liberal 
economy embedded in an authoritarian political framework.  
 
The term “authoritarian liberalism” is most closely associated with the 
conservative German jurist Carl Schmitt who, in the 1920s and 1930s, 
developed a theory of a strong state coexisting with a free economy. Long out of 
fashion because of his association with the rise of Nazism, Schmitt’s ideas have 
recently been propelled to the center of discussion to explain the coupling of 
neo-conservatism and market economics (McCormick 1997; Dyzenhaus 1998; 
Cristi 1998). In a series of essays Kanishka Jayasuriya explicitly identifies 
Schmitt’s conception of the political economy as underpinning the 
reorganization of state authority and regulatory frameworks in East and 
Southeast Asia. Central to these political-economic forms is “the emergence of 
the new regulatory state, which is directed towards the production of economic 
and social order within a globalised economy” (Jayasuriya 2005; see also 
Jayasuriya 2000 and 2001). The rationale behind this attempted transformation 
of political authority is clear. Through the provision of new regulatory 
frameworks, the state seeks to insulate a range of key economic institutions from 
the influence of democratic politics and thereby safeguard the market order. The 
outcome is an explicit linkage between authoritarian politics and a rules-based 
mode of governance in a range of economic policy areas. It is, in Jayasuriya’s 
(2001: 8) memorable phrase, “a politics of anti politics”.   
                                                          
*  Initial drafts of this paper were presented in two separate forums organized by the Institute for Popular 
Democracy (IPD), Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), and Laban ng Masa (LnM) on 11 and 30 August 
2006. I would like to thank the organizers for the invitation, and especially the participants for their valuable 
comments and insights. I thank the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tallinn University of 
Technology (Estonia), where I am enrolled as a PhD Student, and the School for Postgraduate 
Interdisciplinary Research on Interculturalism and Transnationality (SPIRIT) and Global Development 
Studies (GDS) at Aalborg University, where I was Visiting Doctoral Scholar for the period 15 August – 15 
December 2007, for a very generous academic culture that has made possible the completion of this paper. 
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This paper draws explicitly on Jayasuriya’s insights to develop a critique of the 
political-economic reforms envisioned by the present Philippine government. In 
doing so, it tackles head-on the claim that economic liberalization necessarily 
encourages the development of liberal and democratic modes of governance. For 
a while in the early 1990s, the consonance between liberal capitalism and 
political liberalism became the mantra of mainstream scholars as well as of 
practical proponents of so-called democratic transitions. They assumed that the 
liberation of a self-reliant and progressive middle class from authoritarian rule 
was a functional requirement of well-managed markets. Today, such a claim 
appears hollow. 
 
Theoretically, the model of liberal democracy generally proposed in the 
transitions literature was always thin. It alienated the idea of democracy from its 
social connotation as popular power in favor of “formal” and procedural criteria, 
symbolized above all by the holding of regular multi-party elections and the 
“effectiveness” of political institutions. The principles and associated practices 
of people’s sovereignty, including the accountability and responsiveness of 
governments, and political expression and participation by voters and citizens, 
hardly featured at all in this research program. Empirically, the Southeast Asian 
region appears to demonstrate a quite different prospectus from that of the 
transitions discourse. All the countries of the region—with the partial exception 
of Burma/Myanmar—have undergone capitalist revolutions and become 
increasingly integrated into the circuits of the global economy. At the same time, 
most of these states have durable authoritarian political systems. In fact, pace 
the transitions perspective, globalization may in fact mean the end of liberal 
democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy (Cammack 1998). Historically, 
then, if there is any cogent lesson that the past two decades have shown about 
the relationship between democracy and political-economic regime, it is that 
capitalism can thrive and survive even without democracy. As Rodan et al. 
(2006: 26) put it: “the bourgeoisie is not a necessary force for political 
liberalism and democracy … indeed, elements of it might well be profoundly 
illiberal and anti-democratic if this serves their interests”. To this extent, 
Schmitt’s characterization of the strong state and the free economy appears to 
have more traction than the proponents of liberalism would care to admit. 
 
The Philippines is an ideal illustration of the dynamic processes of state 
transformation that have been in train. Since the heady days of the People Power 
revolution of 1986, the country has experienced a political transformation that 
has reconsolidated elite forms of political power in frameworks that are more 
congruent with a highly attenuated version of democracy. A succession of 
administrations have built a state characterized by limited accountable 
government, relatively unfree and unfair competitive elections, partially 
curtailed substantial civil and political rights, and compromised associational 
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autonomy (Cammack 1998; Pinches 1997). At the same time, the last two 
decades also witnessed a concerted effort to integrate the Philippine economy—
historically more “open” than many of its neighbors—into the global economy 
through a series of market reforms. The push towards liberalization was 
substantively set in motion by Corazon Aquino in 1986 (with the Philippine 
Privatization Program), and then further advanced by the subsequent presidency 
of Fidel Ramos who actively sought to attract new flows of international private 
capital. Both Aquino and Ramos embraced neoliberal ideology—the adoption of 
free market doctrines and their application to all aspects of economic activity—
though departed from the ideal-type of policy prescription advocated by the 
Washington Consensus in response to particular vested interests. 
 
This double movement of authoritarian liberalism has qualitatively accelerated 
since the assumption of power by Arroyo in 2001. She has set out systematically 
to construct a dependent capitalist economy, governed according to a new 
generation of neoliberal policies, and overseen by what she terms a “strong 
republic”. The evidence for Arroyo’s strategy of hollowing out the country’s 
democratic institutions is legion. The use of security laws to intimidate and 
detain critics is accompanied by intimidation through the courts and diverse 
legislation to constrain collective political action. She has appointed saboteurs of 
democracy in the Commission on Elections; she has constructed a powerful 
Congressional coalition whose main purpose seems to spend institutional 
resources in aid of the President herself; the Supreme Court has failed to act in a 
timely fashion on pressing constitutional issues; the integrity of the Commission 
on Audit and the Civil Service Commission has been questioned; the 
Commission on Human Rights—supposedly the guardian of political rights—
has been ignored; the media and civil society have been disciplined. Against the 
odds, then, Arroyo’s administration has survived despite its tarnished 
legitimacy, poor economic performance and a seemingly powerful constellation 
of oppositional forces. These are signs of the times: a forbidding project to 
construct a lasting authoritarian social order is being reproduced.  
 
This paper analyzes the transformation of the Philippine state toward a version 
of authoritarian liberalism through an interrogation of the Consultative 
Commission’s Proposed Revision of the 1987 Constitution which, it is 
suggested, is the most complete articulation of this project. The paper is 
organized in three parts. First, it briefly delineates the composition of the 
appointees to the Consultative Commission—a network of businesspeople, real 
estate developers, bankers, lawyers, and academics with a strong vested interest 
in expanding the scope of market reforms. Second, it closely examines the 
content of the Commission’s proposal, revealing the elitist and capitalist 
character of the proposals that are both implicitly and explicitly articulated in the 
proposed Charter’s discursive strategies. And finally, it concludes with an 
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analysis of the nature of market-led development through the reconstitution of 
social relations and the instauration of a “strong republic” that is explicitly anti-
democratic. Neoliberalism requires a significant redesigning of the state. The 
reading of the Charter proposed here suggests that the clear intention of the 
Commission is to configure new institutions that are more likely to secure the 
conditions for elite and capitalist reproduction in the Philippines within the 
framework of a neoliberal “strong republic”. 
 
 
The Commissioners for Charter Change 
On 19 August 2005 Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 453 creating the 
Consultative Commission (ConCom). Its mandate was explicit; it  
 
shall conduct consultations and studies and propose amendments and 
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, principally the proposals to shift from the 
presidential-unitary system to a parliamentary-federal system of government, 
to refocus economic policies in the Constitution to match the country’s vision 
for global competitiveness, and to review economic policies which tend to 
hinder the country’s global competitiveness and adversely affect the people’s 
welfare (Consultative Commission 2005a). 
 
The Charter Change project was launched as the administration’s response to a 
perceived social crisis, what it termed “our chronic political, economic and 
cultural problems.” The starting point of the project is the recognition by the 
administration that the dynamics of political-economic change are increasingly 
shaped by the promotion of investment and domestic entrepreneurship and the 
pursuit of global competitiveness (Cammack 2006). At the same time, the re-
design of the state along the lines envisaged by the Charter Change project also 
reflects changing models of national political-economic management and, as a 
result, new configurations of decision-making authority over all political, social, 
economic and cultural affairs. 
 
When the 55 members of the ConCom (this was a rather loose interpretation of 
the intention that the Commission be composed of not more than fifty members) 
were appointed, it was chaired by the well-known academic and passionate 
proponent of federalism, Jose V. Abueva, who carried the banner of the Charter 
Change project. The ConCom literally embodied those actors who were chosen 
to operate within and upon the agencies of national economic governance. Who 
were the 55 appointees to draft Arroyo’s vision for a globally competitive 
Philippine political economy? A college of businesspeople, real estate 
developers, bankers, political elites and leaders, pro-market labor unionists, 
academics and lawyers—most of them predisposed to a neoliberal model of 
governance that is more responsive to the market forces than to popular-
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democratic forces. The composition of the ConCom, then, a priori excluded the 
possibility of political or policy alternatives. It set out explicitly to promote 
competitive capitalism on the national scale, and the preserve of the system of 
elite rule that has been the hallmark of the Philippine polity for the past century. 
 
The list of the Commissioners (available for scrutiny together with their 
affiliations at the Consultative Commission website [Consultative Commission 
2005b]) reveals a large majority who not only are drawn from identifiable elite 
forces but who have articulated broad support for advancing the central 
objectives of the neoliberal agenda. Of course, it has been in Malacañang’s 
interest to present the Commissioners as not only being competent in their own 
fields but somehow existing above the political fray which is said to be so 
debilitating to the reform agenda. As Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita put 
it, the Commissioners are supposedly the best and brightest personalities in the 
country representing “a broad spectrum of views and backgrounds that would 
make for a free, open and responsible debate on political reforms without the 
extra baggage of political ambition or self-serving interests” (Consultative 
Commission 2005). In fact, Ermita’s comment is extremely revealing of the new 
politics of political-economic reform as “anti politics”. There is an assumption 
here that “politics” that reflect “interests” will muddy the waters of market 
reform. In its place the government seems to impose a self-restricting set of 
procedures—underpinned by appeals to the rule of law and constitutional 
niceties—as a substitute for the old politics of conflict and bargaining. It 
pretends that reforms can be magically implemented without the need for 
compromises, coalitions or conflicts. In effect, then, the ConCom was 
established as a governance mechanism deliberately to protect the market order 
from political interference which, of course, is a highly politicized strategy 
(Jayasuriya 2001: pp. 8 ff.). The ConCom is like a shadow play of the very real 
transformations that the Philippine state is currently undergoing. 
 
 
Constitutionalizing Authoritarian Liberalism: Governance in a Neo-liberal 
World  
It is against the background of Arroyo’s well-documented predisposition to 
authoritarianism and market-driven anti politics—and, as we have seen, a 
ConCom replete with representatives elite political and economic forces—that 
the proposed revision to the 1987 Constitution was inaugurated and is being 
advanced. It was launched in the midst of a deep structural crisis and with latent 
threats to Arroyo’s own political fortunes. While the issues of timing (during 
Arroyo’s presidency or beyond), mode of change (through a people’s initiative, 
constitutional convention, or a constituent assembly) and vested interests (of 
Arroyo and her allies, as well as of ConCom members) are important to the 
public debate about Charter Change, an equally important analytical task is to 
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unpack the neoliberal ideas, and the elitist philosophy that comes with it, being 
institutionalized in ConCom’s proposed Constitution. The understanding of 
neoliberalism used here refers to the application of free market doctrines not 
only to all aspects of economic activity but increasingly to the operation of 
public institutions. As David Harvey (2005) has commented, neoliberalism 
elevates the private sector, private property and their attendant values to a 
dominant role in society. Here, we argue that ConCom’s Proposed Revision of 
the 1987 Constitution is a blueprint for the institutionalization of precisely this 
neoliberal kind of governance. In particular, it outlines the fundamental 
institutional framework for market-led development through the strengthening 
of market-driven social relations, and a strong state able to manage the 
contradictions of the elitist and capitalist systems.  
 
Market-led Development through Market-driven Social Relations 
From the perspective of capital, the 1987 Constitution is a burden and a threat to 
capitalist hegemony—especially to its current configuration, neoliberalism. As a 
political institutional framework, it is a threat to the neoliberal offensive in a 
number of senses. It allocates a prominent role for the state in the spheres of 
social life. It affirms labor “as a primary social economic force”. It privileges the 
provision of an industrial policy in which the national development strategy is to 
be pursued through industrialization. And, its outmoded political- economic 
provisions are said to constrain free capital mobility and the attendant drive 
toward  competitive capitalism.   
 
The Charter Change project comes at a time when the neoliberal revolution is 
intensifying and, at the same time, pressing for new policy priorities and taking 
new institutional forms. State architectures are being reorganized in such a way 
that the requirements of international competitiveness are internalized. The 
proposed Charter seeks to institutionally embed what successive Philippine 
governments have long been committed to: the pursuit of an “open market 
economy” through macro-economic structural adjustments in the policies of 
privatization, deregulation, and liberalization. Further, it aims to create a 
globally “competitive” Philippines through comprehensive institutional reforms 
and behavioral change (which includes a change in values) in relation to the 
market and the creation of “competition cultures,” labor market flexibility, and 
the development of “human capital.” 
 
(a) “Market! Market!”: The Institutionalization of the Capitalist Ethos 
In any Constitution, the article on “Declaration of Principles and State Policies” 
(Article 2 in the case of the Philippines) outlines a nation’s values. National 
values as enshrined in the Constitution are things, ideas, principles, and policies 
that people in a given territory regard as important to national life at a particular 
historical moment.  One of the most interesting ways their significance has been 
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understood in critical standpoints on political economy has been through the 
concept of the “moral economy”. As Andrew Sayer (2003: 1) has noted:  
 
The moral economy embodies norms and sentiments regarding the 
responsibilities and rights of individuals and institutions with respect to 
others. These norms and sentiments go beyond matters of justice and equality, 
to conceptions of the good, for example regarding needs and the ends of 
economic activity. 
 
This acute insight offers us a critical reading of precisely how the authors of the  
constitutional changes propose to constitutionalize their own moral-political 
norms and sentiments. 
 
The proposed changes in Article 2 assert a new set of values for the Filipino 
people, deleting each and every provision on the state’s responsibility for social 
entitlements as affirmed in the 1987 Constitution—in particular, the role of the 
state in the provision of education, health, youth development, communication 
and information, and balanced and healthful ecology. The removal of these 
provisions means something profound, much more profound than the very 
narrow legal critique about the verbosity of the 1987 Constitution. It means the 
introduction of new set of values for a neoliberal world order. What is left 
unsaid in the proposed “state declaration” is that all those social entitlements are 
better left to the market forces. Central to this is the abandonment of state’s 
promotion of “total human liberation and development” in favor of market 
values. They are now tasked to be satisfied not by the state but by private 
provision in the market.  
 
Even more striking is the overt provision in the proposed Constitution asserting 
the capitalist ethos as regards property that would disembed the market from the 
society. The proposed Constitution (Article XIV, Section 5 [National 
Patrimony]) deletes the significant sentence in the 1987 Constitution which 
affirms that the market is firmly embedded in the society: “The use of property 
bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common 
good” (Article XII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution). The deletion of this 
declaration only means the institutionalization of a system of appropriation that 
is very much private; and hence concealing the fact that the system of private 
appropriation in capitalism implicates the whole of society. In addition, while 
the proposed Constitution recognizes the “authority” of the state to promote 
distributive justice and to intervene for the common good, it does not anymore 
see these functions as the “duty” of the state. Yet public institutions, including 
the proposed Constitution, must all be mobilized in order to sustain this system 
of private property that carries no public responsibility. 
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The framers of the proposed Constitution then go on to spell out the duty of 
every Filipino citizen in a new article called “Bill of Duties” (Article V). The 
article enjoins the citizens to contribute to “good governance” and the “vitality 
and viability of democracy.” But this merely begs the question: “good 
governance” for whom? In a neoliberal world, “good governance” is for the 
capitalist market. The World Bank (2002: 99) explicitly defined its neoliberal 
stance on good governance: 
 
Good governance includes the creation, protection, and enforcement of 
property rights, without which the scope for market transactions is limited. It 
includes the provision of a regulatory regime that works with the market to 
promote competition. And it includes the provision of sound macroeconomic 
policies that create a stable environment for market activity. Good governance 
also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy 
and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets.   
 
Good governance then is for market transactions and for market activity, an 
institutional framework that works with the market and that supports markets. 
What we have now are the Philippine elitist and capitalist class in alliance with 
transnational capital crying, “Market! Market!” But there is an alternative 
critical hypothesis. If they are providing a prominent role for the market that 
implicates the lives of each and every Filipino, why not provide a bill of duties 
as well for the market? The market fundamentalists have a quick answer to this: 
capital does not have citizenship and it is only loyal to profit. As such, market 
cannot contribute to the “vitality and viability of democracy” because it is not 
simply a space of freedom and choice, but of domination, coercion, greed, need 
or desire. 
 
(b) The Neo-liberal Offensive: An Ideological Assault on Workers 
The institutionalization of capitalist hegemony is not complete without 
launching an ideological assault on the workers. In particular, it must change the 
society’s consciousness towards labor—from the existing social declaration that 
labor is a source of value and wealth, to a new capitalist mindset that regards 
labor only as a cost. It is for this reason that the 1987 Constitution’s declaration 
that “[t]he State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect 
the rights of workers and promote their welfare” has to be revised in such a way 
that provides the platform needed for the project of creating the conditions for 
the hegemony of capital over labor, upon which capitalist reproduction 
ultimately depends. In the proposed Constitution, the word “responsible” is 
added to describe the role of labor as a social economic force. And it then 
guarantees not only the rights of the workers, but the private sector as well. It 
says, “The State affirms labor as a primary and responsible social economic 
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force. The State shall protect and promote the welfare of both workers and 
employers.” (Article 2, Section 11, ConCom).  
 
The revision is consistent with the emphasis put forward by the World Bank, the 
architect of neoliberalism itself, in the mid-1990s on the role of workers in an 
integrating world. The Bank promotes “effective” unions, and indeed 
“responsible” labor, that would work with the market and help firms extract 
more profit; but not to protect jobs, distort markets, and oppose reforms and 
structural adjustment programs (see World Bank 1995). The Bank then proudly 
asserted in the late 1990s that “nothing is more significant to economic growth 
than the private sector” (Wolfensohn 1999: 19-20). It is true that the framers of 
the proposed Constitution still provide for affirmative actions as regards the 
liberation of women against oppression and the rights of indigenous peoples and 
all the other identities. The capitalist system they are trying to constitutionalize 
can tolerate the rights and liberation of these identities because the system is in 
fact resistant to them. What they cannot affirm and tolerate however is the 
liberation of the workers.  
 
(c) Neo-classical Economics Redux, Neo-liberal Policies Institutionalized 
The article on “National Economy and Patrimony” in the 1987 Constitution 
outlines a kind of Keynesian economics, reflective of the longstanding project of 
national developmentalism that still held some ideological sway in that period. It 
stresses the goals of the national economy to include “a more equitable 
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the 
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the 
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for 
all, especially the underprivileged.” Hence, it provides for an industrial policy in 
which industrialization is the core development strategy—providing adequate 
social services, promotes full employment, a rising standard of living, and an 
improved quality of life for all.  The key idea of an industrial policy is not 
simply about protectionism, but the systematic “coordination” among economic 
actors (state, business, workers, and other social actors) and economic sectors 
(manufacturing, agriculture, and services) toward economic development. The 
proposed Constitution (especially in Articles II and XIV) discards these 
Keynesian provisions altogether, paving the way for the institutionalization of 
neo-classical economics (with its equality assumptions that all economic 
activities are qualitatively alike in contributing to economic growth) and neo-
liberal policies (with its excessive market optimism that could usher in 
development). 
 
Interestingly, the framers of the 1987 Constitution were not unaware of the 
history of economic development and thus the powerful analytical tool of 
development economics. They discarded the mother of all assumptions in neo-
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classical economics: the assumption of no diversity and no qualitative 
difference; hence the equilibrium metaphor that portrays the market as a 
mechanism creating automatic harmony. The 1987 Constitution understands 
development as a process of cumulative causations which are the joint effects of 
factors excluded by the neo-classical equilibrium metaphors. Among other 
things, it recognizes: (a) the qualitative difference between economic activities 
(across and within manufacturing, services, and agriculture); (b) the diversity 
(the degree of division of labor); (c) synergies (linkages and clusters between 
manufacturing, services, and agriculture sectors); (d) institutions (to safeguard 
the common good); and, (e) novelty (significance of innovation, learning, and 
science). It regards the manufacturing industry as key to economic development, 
and that a combination of manufacturing activities and a large division of labor 
is crucial in creating a wealthy nation. The benefits the 1987 Constitution claims 
for this strategy include reducing unemployment, increasing the tax base by 
creating high-income individuals, helping solve balance of payments problems, 
and increasing the velocity of money circulation. The 1987 Constitution thus 
aims to copy the development strategies of wealthy economies characterized by 
increasing returns, specializing in activities where the opportunities for 
innovation are the largest with a large division of labor and diversity, dynamic 
synergies and strong institutions, and intensified innovation (see Reinert 2007). 
 
The core ideas that derived from mainstream development economics in the 
1987 Constitution are now being driven out of the discourse. The 1987 
Constitution values synergy—specifically, the priority the state has to put on a 
dynamic manufacturing industry (manufacturing), comprehensive rural 
development and agrarian reform (agriculture), and the development of people’s 
skills and talents for science and technology (services). The idea is to achieve a 
diversified economic sector besides agriculture and raw materials. Agriculture, 
or services, may serve as an engine of growth but not alone in monoculture 
without a manufacturing sector. This synergy among economic sectors is 
embedded in “policy coordination” intrinsic in any industrialization strategy and 
in the history of economic development: the coordination of education policy, 
industrial policy, innovation policy, trade policy, and competition policy. But 
the neo-classical sensibility behind the proposed Constitution is unable to 
register synergies and linkages. It is also unable to register qualitative 
differences (including the different potentials of economic activities as carriers 
of economic growth) and to cope with innovations and novelties, especially how 
differently these are distributed among economic activities (see Jomo KS and 
Reinert 2005; Reinert 2007.1  
                                                          
1 Intuitively, the framers of the 1987 Constitution had at least some inkling of the vital role that 
manufacturing has played historically in the development of sustainable economies. As Reinert notes: “For 
centuries the term “manufacturing” was synonymous with the combination of technological change, 
increasing returns and imperfect competition. By cultivating manufacturing, nations captured the “good” 
type of economic activities. I argue that this has been the pattern of success starting in England under Henry 
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For a long time now, the government has prioritized the service sector simply 
because it claims it is the country’s “comparative and competitive advantage” 
over other similarly-placed economies. In addition to the deletion of the 
provisions mandating the state to promote agricultural and industrial 
development, it is striking that the proposed Constitution also deletes the 
mandate for the state to pursue a “trade policy” that serves the general welfare 
on the basis of the principles of “equality and reciprocity.” The proposed 
Constitution spells out an explicit priority on services. In this regard, it is acting 
in ways analogous to the most developed economies in the World Trade 
Organization with their primary concern with the deregulation of free trade in 
services under the terms of the stalled Doha Round. But the kinds of services the 
government promotes are not even knowledge-intensive, and they include most 
of the economic activities of the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and call 
centers. Take, for example, the call centers. Apart from several alienations most 
call center agents suffer (such as alienation from one’s own labor, geography, 
family and friends, and educational attainment), working in most call centers 
only requires a handful of skills: (English) communication skills and 
consumption of coffee to keep one awake. Services may be at par with the 
significant role manufacturing once did in the developed world. However, the 
service sector, even if it is knowledge-intensive, cannot grow and thrive without 
demand from a diversified manufacturing base. In this sense, synergies among 
economic sectors—i.e. the dynamic interaction among manufacturing, services, 
and agriculture—are a prerequisite for sustainable economic development. 
Without regard for this significant insight, the Philippines remains a specialist in 
being poor (see Jomo KS and Reinert 2005). That is why even if the latter 
articles (from XV to XVIII) and sections in the proposed Constitution define the 
role and responsibility of the state in education, health, protection of labor, 
social justice, strengthening of family, among others, it is hard to believe them. 
The market-led, service-oriented development strategy enshrined in the proposal 
simply cannot fulfill these injunctions. Indeed, to constitutionalize requires 
constitutional lies.  
 
The proposed Constitution’s regard for the promotion of all citizens’ right to 
quality education and the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation serves 
as a prime illustration of this kind of shadow play. Under conditions of a 
market-led, service-oriented development strategy, massive investment in 
education for the development of human resources merely feeds out-migration. 
This is not to suggest however that education must be only responsive to the 
needs of the industry in a simplistic functional way. It only shows how “policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
VII, via the industrialization of continental Europe and the United States, to the more recent successes of 
Korea and Taiwan.” For the classical account of the backwardness of the Philippine elites who focused on 
diminishing returns activities with no technological innovation and attenuated industrial diversification see 
Rivera (1994).  
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coordination” of education policy, industrial policy, and other policies are 
indispensable to economic development. This, however, is no problem for 
Arroyo and her economic managers, for the export of educated workers is 
precisely their palliative economics: the government actually sees virtue in the 
fact that thousands of Filipinos emigrate every day and send back remittances to 
boost the economy’s GDP. In connection to this palliative economics is another 
constitutional lie as regards the maintenance of the provision in the proposed 
Constitution (Article XVII, Section 1) that “The State recognizes the Filipino 
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, the State shall strengthen its 
solidarity and actively promote its total development.” The fact of the 
tremendous social costs of migration is well-known and is available to those 
who wish to understand them. But the implication of the government’s 
migration policy for family relations is best captured in the words of Marx and 
Engels (1998 [1848]) more than a century-and-a-half ago: the policy for mass 
migration “has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced 
the family relation into a mere money relation.”  
 
An industrial policy still makes sense for the developing world in the era of 
globalization. There is a need for developing countries like the Philippines to 
pursue industrialization which could address the issues of production and 
redistribution, and usher in civilization and long-term development. In 
particular, a very strong and efficient manufacturing sector that is able to 
perpetually enhance its technological capability, and able to create local 
synergistic exchange between different economic activities in the urban and 
rural spaces, as well as possessing diverse economic base, a dynamic division of 
labor, and specializing in increasing returns activities. Indeed, a strong case 
could be made for the proposition that industrialization strategy has a great 
potential to tackle the immiseration of millions of Filipino people. But there is a 
sensitive fundamental issue that (transnational) capital and pro-capital political 
forces would hardly dare to take risk: only a dynamic industry is able to create 
formal employment—let alone, full employment—in which a “critical mass” 
and a countervailing power of labor unions are socially formed. 
 
(d) A Project for Capitalist Modernization 
The resurgence of neo-classical economics has been accompanied by 
neoliberalism’s project for capitalist modernization, which is often sugar-coated 
in the good governance rhetoric of capital’s transnational agencies. The 
neoliberal project aims to create a genuinely competitive capitalism, and hence 
sweeping away all the inherited evils and vestiges of pre-capitalist, feudal 
relations. For capitalists and pro-capitalist political forces, the reproduction of 
capitalism in the Philippines suffers from the incompleteness of capitalist 
development because of limited competition and market access for “global” 
capital. This vision for capitalist modernization is the central reason the 
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proposed Charter allows for “foreign” capital to operate in the country; provides 
mechanisms for easy “entry” and “exit” of capitalist enterprises; maintains the 
pursuit of flexibility and productivity through labor market reforms for 
competitiveness; and restructures the Philippine geography into competing sites 
of accumulation under a federal system.    
 
First, the proposed Constitution promotes capitalist competition by allowing 
foreign ownership of industrial, commercial, or residential lands and assets 
(including the mass media); and it guarantees as well the rights of foreign capital 
to explore the minerals and natural resources of the country. As such, the 
sentence in the 1987 Constitution that identifies “a sustained increase in the 
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the 
people” as one of the goals of the national economy has been deleted in the 
proposal. The national economy is then envisioned to embrace production for 
profit more than the production for needs. In doing so, the proposed Charter 
guarantees the rights of international capital, in greater scope and depth than 
ever.  
 
Second, the proposed Constitution removes policies it regards barriers to easy 
and quick entry and exit of firms. For instance, the limits imposed by the 1987 
Constitution on private corporations, individuals, and “foreign” capital in terms 
of time, area, and scope of landholding, lease, co-production, and joint ventures 
have been deleted. This framework for a reduction of policy-related barriers to 
easy “entry” and “exit” of firms is important especially for firm-level 
competition and for a firm’s productivity growth in particular. However, this 
guarantees the untrammeled adventurism of free capital mobility known for its 
short-termist predisposition. Rather than enhancing the efficacy of the country’s 
macroeconomic policy that will encourage longer-term investment and at the 
same time raise some taxes, the proposed Constitution actually makes the 
Philippines highly vulnerable to capital flight.  
 
Third, the proposed Charter maintains the provision on labor productivity, now 
under the neoliberal agenda of labor market reform. This implies the creation of 
a “flexible” labor force as a key strategy to the establishment of competition 
cultures and the promotion of competitiveness. At both the national and firm 
levels, increasing labor productivity—hence, the increase in capital/labor ratio—
is the essence of competitiveness and the key to ensuring survival and long-run 
growth. Yet, competition and expansion depend not on workers’ salaries but on 
unit labor cost, i.e. a combination of effective cost per worker and the 
productivity of labor. In the context of intensifying global competition that 
generates pressures to lower wages and induce poor labor standards across the 
world, the asymmetry between the goals of increasing productivity, on the one 
hand, and rising real wages, on the other, is logically apparent in the 
 14
competitiveness rhetoric. Hence, under such conditions, the proposed 
Constitution is being economical with the truth when it says that “expanding 
productivity” is “the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the 
underprivileged.” 
 
Fourth, the project to reconstruct the Philippine political geography under a 
federal system also implies an economic logic for capital (ConCom Article XII). 
Central to this is the creation of “autonomous territories in the country” to be 
transformed into centers of accumulation; that is to say, competing sites of 
accumulation. The uneven character of development in the country in which 
primitive/feudal/pre-capitalist relations coexist with modern features of the 
society suggests that different territories require distinctive strategies for capital 
accumulation from autonomous territory to autonomous territory within the 
geographical landscape of national capitalism. As such, the proposed Charter 
provides for more comprehensive primary legislative powers for every 
autonomous territory, to include socio-economic activities such as “planning, 
budget, management, finance, agriculture and fisheries, natural resources, 
energy, environment, technology, transportation, housing, health and social 
welfare, and labor and employment” (ConCom Article XII, Section 16) which 
are excluded in the narrow and limited administrative-socio-cultural scope the 
1987 Constitution provides for local government units. The ambitious vision 
will thus turn the Philippine landscape into a huge bazaar with localities 
competing for investments and markets and hence peddling their workforces, 
offering the lowest prices for doing business. It would compel not only localities 
but also businesses to compete with one another. The idea is that businesses, 
under intensified domestic competition, would be able to cope with the rigors of 
international competition. This is the politics of a genuinely competitive 
capitalism: it is not simply about satisfying businesses’ wants, it is also about 
forcing businesses to be competitive. And here lies the system’s inherent 
contradiction: capital is completely dependent on the market, and the logic of 
competition must be perpetually realized for its survival and self-reproduction. 
 
Indeed, one must recognize that it is intrinsic in the capitalist modernization 
project to create a new ruling class that would compete with, and could even 
replace, the old trapos, landlords, bosses, and capitalists. But one must also 
recognize that the social relations would be the same: capitalist and elitist; still 
the hegemony of capital over labor, and the real subsumption of the masses to 
the elites. Accordingly, one must also recognize that it is intrinsic in the project 
to alleviate poverty not simply through the traditional neoliberal strategy of 
market “trickle down” effects. It is also through the innovative contemporary 
neoliberal strategy of “accumulation of human capital,” that is the productive 
utilization of the most abundant asset of the poor: labor. However, one must also 
recognize the limitations of such project that leaves the system unchanged—the 
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very same system that reproduces poverty, upon which the secret of its survival 
ultimately lies. 
 
A Strong Republic, But Not Democratic 
Apparently evident in the crafting of the proposed Constitution is the fact that 
globalization does not bring about the end of the nation state but rather its re-
design. States are in fact authors of globalization by the way they sign 
international agreements, legislate policies, and promulgate constitutions to 
effect their internal reorganization for global capitalism. The contested 
ideologies of the “appropriate” state form take place not only at the discursive 
and normative levels (though these are important) but on crucial bureaucratic, 
institutional terrains as well. The nation state remains the world’s universal 
political form and the indispensable medium of global capital. The market, on 
the other hand, is a blind force which needs supporting governments and social 
institutions as well as a stable political order and legal framework that would 
provide a certain degree of predictability for capital. At the same time, there is 
no “invisible hand” that automatically corrects market failures; and as such, 
there is need for non-market responses (i.e., from states and other social actors) 
to market imperfections. Against this background, the idea of a “strong state” or 
a “strong republic” is not at all incompatible with neoliberalism so long as the 
dynamics of capitalist competition are promoted without fear or favor.   
 
While the proposed Constitution is a project of capital (and pro-capital political 
forces) and the elites (and pro-elite forces) who vehemently believe in capitalist 
market-led development and elite rule, it likewise reflects the surrender of the 
Philippine state to a genuinely global capitalist system. It is no longer the old-
style imperialism of the rich simply extracting value from the poor, but of a new 
variant of subjecting poor countries and the workers to the imperatives of the 
market. It would be uncritical, however, to assume that the local managers of the 
global capitalist system, together with the elites and pro-elite rule forces, are not 
critical. Arroyo and her political economic advisers need to be “critical” as their 
opponents in the sense that they need to be mindful of the complex processes at 
work in making the system run smoothly and that they are able to find 
innovative responses as crises and conflicts arise. After all, the maintenance of 
the status quo is not an easy task. They are all too aware of the fact that crises, 
contradictions, and clashes of interests are inherent in both the capitalist and 
elitist systems. In order to compensate for their limited capacity to manage the 
affairs of the economy they have to manage the polity instead. Managing the 
polity conducive to a neoliberal economy involves the containment of conflicts 
and class struggles, absorption of risks to capital, as well as providing the 
assurance of state legitimacy through the ballots. Thus, a strong republic could 
actually be a positive asset for neoliberalism.  
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Indeed, the complexities of the capitalist and elitist systems, the crises they 
induce, and the conflicts they provoke would even require much more intrusive 
state intervention and much more comprehensive state planning, coordinated at 
the international scale, than the most orthodox statists could imagine. Having 
this in mind, the framers of the proposed Charter find it imperative to reform the 
public sector in order to promote an attractive investment climate; set-up a 
decision-making institution like the parliamentary form conducive for 
capitalism’s need for periodic adjustment; and institutionalize an elitist 
republican virtue that is not democratic. 
 
(a) Public Sector Reform for and with Markets 
The 1987 Constitution enjoins public officers and employees to serve the 
people, to whom they are at all times accountable, with “utmost responsibility” 
among other virtues (Article XI, Section 1). The proposed Constitution, on the 
other hand, enjoins public officers and employees to serve the people with 
“utmost efficiency” (Article XIII, Section 1) consistent with its 
institutionalization of market values, or the use of business techniques within the 
state as in the “new public management” framework, treating the values required 
of a democracy such as due process, openness, justice and responsibility as mere 
liabilities. The emphasis on “efficiency” by which public service is defined in 
the proposed Constitution thus recognizes the need for greater government 
efficiency as a precursor to creating the environment right for business and the 
requirements of productivity, rather than the notion of a moral economy derived 
from matters of justice, equality and the public good. The logic is clear: the 
public sector forms a substantial part of the economy; and as such productivity 
in this sector has an important and direct impact for the productivity 
performance of the economy as a whole.      
  
Government institutions do not merely provide certain degree of predictability 
for capital. To a large extent, they also manage market forces through policies of 
privatization (the sale of public assets to private investors) and liberalization 
(opening up of restricted markets to competition). Equally important for the 
system is that market forces are institutionally managed through the 
reorientation of regulation, in particular a regulatory framework in a regime of 
“de-regulation,” privatization, and liberalization. However, the central task of 
this regulation under a neoliberal regime is to secure the interest of business, and 
not of the citizenry writ large. This is the context within which public sector 
reform is introduced, one that works for and with the market. But again, as has 
been mentioned above, the accountability of the market—whose conduct of 
business implicates the rest of the society—is not defined in the proposed 
Charter. It therefore enforces the separation of “the economic” and “the 
political” in capitalist discipline as well as the paradox at the heart of capitalist 
production: the exclusion of the poor and workers from wealth and yet their 
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inclusion in the circuits of its production. Further, it implies that the state, and 
hence the Filipino citizenry, will be the absorber of risks as well as failures of 
market adventurism. 
 
This does not mean, however, that the public sector should not be reformed and 
that public officers and employees should not be efficient. Of course, public 
service productivity and efficiency is important for the needs of the people and 
the legitimate demands of taxpayers, and the building of infrastructure for 
education, health, and transportation. It is simply to point out how market forces 
are also institutionally managed through “corporatization” (public sector 
organizations adopting corporate form of organization as well as corporate 
values). It is also to simply point out that contrary to the philosophy of the 
market fundamentalists that markets are always efficient and that state 
intervention is wrong; markets are not always efficient, and governments are not 
necessarily inefficient.  
 
(b)Parliament for Markets 
Taking into account contemporary political conjuncture and the configuration of 
power relations, especially the seeming absence of alternatives clear to the 
people and the apparent lack of a vibrant political party dynamics in the country, 
the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government at this time 
would provide a formidable institutional guarantee for the long-term lifelong 
political leadership of Arroyo and her political clientele. If this shift were 
constitutionalized, sooner than later, the opposition groups will be incorporated 
in the regime, or their dream of electoral victory over the incumbent may be 
nearly impossible. That is a clear political logic. But there is also a deeper 
political economic logic that underpins the need for a transformation of the 
institution for decision-making. It is the link—often broken in contemporary 
discussions—between globalization and a parliamentary form of government. 
 
The premises are straightforward. First, the global capitalist system does not run 
smoothly, but is inherently insecure, precarious, and crisis-ridden; it is subject to 
periodic adjustments which states need to enforce for it to perpetually thrive and 
survive. Thus, globalization is presented not only as a blueprint for continuing 
market-led development, but also as a set of conscious policies and initiatives 
for the management of its contradictions. Second, the foremost strength of a 
parliamentary form of government lies in the fusion of the executive and the 
legislative functions which makes decision- and policy-making relatively fast 
and smooth compared with the presidential system’s proneness to policy 
paralysis. Thus, a parliamentary system is conducive to the institutional 
requirements of the exigencies of (global) capitalism. 
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This need for responsive institutions under conditions of the crisis-ridden system 
is evident at the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis when the task of 
“surveillance” has become one of the core responsibilities of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank as managers of global capitalism. The IMF, 
in particular, under the terms of its Articles of Agreement, undertakes 
“surveillance” of the financial and economic issues of a universal membership 
of 184 countries. Why is surveillance then important for the management of 
global capitalism? In today’s globalized economy, where the economic and 
financial policies of one country may affect many other countries, international 
cooperation to monitor economic developments on a global scale is essential 
(see IMF 2006). By doing surveillance, the global managers of capitalism would 
then be able to detect the vulnerabilities and risks of the global capitalist order at 
an early stage. This, in turn, would allow them to prescribe the restructuring of 
the policy frameworks and institutions of member countries in the guise of 
improving transparency and accountability. In this case, then, a parliamentary 
institution, which is not constrained with too much checks and balances 
characteristic of a presidential form but one which is responsive to the system’s 
recurrent crisis and needs for periodic social restructuring, is essential.         
 
In theory, the parliamentary form of government has its important merits for 
governance, and even for a vibrant democracy. However, the parliamentary 
project in the proposed Constitution is a normative alternative being offered, 
based on the needs and interests of capital and the (incumbent) elites. In this 
context, the parliamentary system would be functional to the capitalist and elitist 
systems. What is lacking in the provision of an alternative form of government 
is the realpolitik in the Philippine society—that is, a political and economic 
alternative grounded in the country’s culture, history, and developmental needs, 
and based on the transformative power of reality. 
   
(c)Republicanism Against Democracy  
The first section in the article on “Declaration of State Principles and Policies” 
in the proposed Constitution reflects a great deal about the Consultative 
Commission’s elitist stance. It says, “The Philippines is a republican state,” full 
stop. As such, it has ceased to declare the Philippine state as “democratic” as in 
the 1987 Constitution. This is not mere oversight. This can only mean that the 
Philippine state remains a republic, but not democratic. The members of the 
ConCom are serious about this. Many of them have strong background in 
political philosophy. In political theory, republicanism is pitted against 
democracy; in particular, to the “excesses” and “dangers” of absolute 
democracy. In the history of political thought, republicanism is intrinsically 
elitist, and even capitalist. In contemporary politics, the United States often 
asserts its republican virtue as a justification for its “exceptionalism” in 
international law. In modern political theory, the central organizing principle of 
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republicanism is the concept of citizenship, which implies not simply the passive 
enjoyment of rights as in liberal democracy but the active participation of 
citizens in pursuit of a common good. Active citizenship however was reserved 
for men of property, and not for women or those men who “lacked the 
wherewithal to live of themselves”—indeed, not for men who depended on his 
livelihood by working for others. The republicans, as well as the liberals, agree 
about the exclusivity of the political nation. Hence, their core conception of 
citizenship is divided between propertied elites and the laboring multitude (see 
Wood 1995). 
 
For the framers of the proposed Constitution, the country’s history of “people 
power” must now be consigned to the past. It is for this reason that the 
republican virtue of representation is enshrined in a doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy. That is to say, there is no legitimate—let alone, constitutional—
politics outside the parliament. While the proposed Charter maintains the word 
“democracy” in the preamble and in some sections, it is a democracy that 
enables elitism and capitalism to survive. Accordingly, the coercive arm of the 
state, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is to be mobilized to protect capital 
and the incumbent elites in office—not anymore as “protector of the people and 
the State” as in the 1987 Constitution. The maintenance of the first sentence 
“Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,” while deleting the 
following sentences that define the role of the military as the “protector of the 
people,” suggests a mandate for the preservation of elite rule. In political theory, 
of course, “civilian authority” does not refer to ordinary civilian, but rather to 
the political elites elected into office and appointed by duly constituted 
authorities. 
 
Indeed, democracy is dangerous to elitism and to capitalism. It is dangerous to 
these unjust social systems especially if we mean “democracy as a social 
relation” in which “the political,” “the economic,” “the cultural,” and all the 
other spheres of social life are not separated from, or merely reflective of, one 
another. Rather, these spheres are organically connected to one another. In this 
sense, political democracy does not only mean the enjoyment of liberal 
freedoms and equally weighted votes among enfranchised citizens, it also means 
the rule of the demos and its original signification as “popular power.” Cultural 
democracy is about being and not about having, in which every human being is 
respected for who one is and not for what one owns. Economic democracy is not 
simply about equitable distribution of wealth, but democracy as the driving 
mechanism of the economy. In a word, democracy is an ideal in complete 
opposition to capitalism and elitism. 
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Conclusion 
The Consultative Commission’s proposed Constitution must be given the 
serious reflection it deserves. The above analysis illustrates how the deepening 
of the logic of a capitalist economy has created the kinds of tensions that the 
Philippine bourgeoisie calculates can only be resolved by the redesign of the 
state itself. The new document proposes to usurp crucial elements of the 1987 
Constitution, which forces of elitism and capitalism regard as a burden and 
threat to their evolving interests. This is not to say that the 1987 Constitution 
was without flaws. Indeed, there is a sense in which it too sought the 
reinstallation of elite forms of rule after the “aberrations” of the Marcos 
dictatorship. But given its timing in the period immediately after “People 
Power” and given the residual discursive power of the idea of national 
development, the 1987 Constitution did possess a more balanced approach to the 
making of the post-dictatorship policy. More than two decades later the world 
has changed. The new project for constitutional change aims to acquire the 
necessary legitimacy for the great transformation it seeks to institutionalize for 
the Philippine society, one that would guarantee the right of the market forces to 
be the dominant director of the fate of human lives. The proponents are brazen 
and unapologetic about their capitalist and elitist stance. As an exercise in the 
“politics of anti politics” it is indeed an illiberal and anti-democratic manifesto.  
 
The Charter Change agenda is nothing if not ambitious. It seeks the kind of 
social change that simultaneously and systematically restructures the political, 
the economic, and the cultural spheres to “fit” with the requirements of capitalist 
development in the current era. This is not an easy task especially under the 
auspices of an elite political class like represented by Arroyo whose economics 
ends when her politics begins. Arroyo’s administration uses the Charter Change 
project as a response to the evident crisis of the political system. While her 
critics think that the political system as a whole is in crisis and that a systemic 
change is most urgently needed, Arroyo only regards it as a crisis of her 
personal popularity and that an alternative is still available within the system. 
But whichever way one may regard the crisis—systemic, institutional, or 
personalistic—Arroyo exerts every effort to make the crisis functional to her as 
well as to the entire elite system. With her “creative destruction” of the failing 
“EDSA institutions,” Arroyo’s reforms intend doing a favor to both the capitalist 
and elitist systems. All social institutions are to be oriented toward the survival 
of Arroyo’s regime in the short term, and the preservation of elite rule and 
capitalism in general. Arroyo may leave her post soon but she is making sure 
that the neoliberal institutions of economic governance are firmly in place. The 
proponents of Charter Change use state power, resources, and institutions to 
shape the will, while nearly all resistance is either parried, silenced or co-opted.   
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But the Charter Change project at the present conjuncture offers an imperfect 
response to the burgeoning crisis of the system. Even if the proposed 
Constitution is to be ratified— either through the by-passing of existing 
institutional procedures or through successful campaigns among the Filipino 
electorate—neoliberalism in a framework of a strong republic is inherently 
unstable and crisis-ridden. The reorientation of capitalist reproduction through 
the promotion of competitive capitalism on a national scale and the preservation 
of elite reproduction through a shift to parliamentary form of government at this 
time would not only perpetually reproduce capitalism and elitism in society. 
Above all, they will generate the reproduction of social antagonisms across the 
Philippine geography. These are social antagonisms directly resulting from the 
assault on democracy, the workers, and the masses constitutive in the proposed 
Constitution. These are social antagonisms that spring from the very logic of 
“authoritarian liberalism” itself. The pressing need now is to develop visions of, 
and argument for, an alternative to the market-driven politics that has become 
the de facto archetype for the “strong state, free economy” in the globalizing 
world. 
 
 
 22
References 
Cammack, P. (1998) “Globalization and the Death of Liberal Democracy”, in European 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 249-263. 
Cammack, P. (2006) “The Politics of Global Competitiveness”, Papers in the Politics of 
Global Competitiveness, No. 1, Manchester Metropolitan University, November. 
Consultative Commission (2005a) “Malacanang Issues Guidelines for Con-Com,” 28 
September 2005, at http://www.concom.ph/news/malacanangissuesguidelines.php. 
Consultative Commission (2005b) “List and Profile of Members”, 7 November 2005, at 
http://www.concom.ph/members/. 
Cristi, R. (1998) Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy, 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 
Dyzenhaus, D., ed. (1998), Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, Durham 
NC: Duke University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
International Monetary Fund (2006), “IMF Surveillance”, IMF Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2000) “Authoritarian Liberalism, Governance and the Emergence of the 
Regulatory State in Post-Crisis East Asia,” in R. Robison et al., Politics and Markets in 
the Wake of the Asian Crisis, London: Routledge, pp. 315-329. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2001) “Governance, Post Washington Consensus and the New Anti Politics,” 
Working Papers Series No. 2, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong 
Kong. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2005) “Beyond Institutional Fetishism: From the Developmental to the 
Regulatory State,” New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 381-387. 
Jomo, KS and E.S. Reinert (2005) The Origins of Development Economics: How Schools of 
Economic Thought Have Addressed Development, London: Zed Books. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1998) [1848] The Communist Manifesto, ed. D. McLellan, Oxford: 
Oxford Paperbacks. 
McCormick, J. (1997) Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Philippines, Republic of, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, at: 
http://www.gov.ph. 
Pinches, M. (1997) “Elite Democracy, Development and People Power: Contending 
Ideologies and Changing Practices in Philippine Politics,” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 21, 
Nos. 2-3, pp. 104-120. 
President of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 453: Creating a Consultative Commission 
to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution in Consultation with Various Sectors of 
Society, Manila, 19 August 2005. 
Reinert, E.S. (2007) How Rich Countries Got Rich…And Why Poor Countries Stay Poor, 
London: Constable. 
Rivera, T.C. (1994) Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and the State in Philippine 
Manufacturing, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. 
Rodan, G., K. Hewison and R. Robison, eds. (2006), Political Economy of South-East Asia: 
Markets, Power and Contestation, 3rd ed., Sydney: Oxford University Press. 
Sayer, A. (2003) “Developing the Critical Standpoints of Radical Political Economy,” 
published by the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, at: 
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/papers/sayer-critical-standpoints-of-radical-
political-economy.pdf. 
Sayer, A. (2004) “Moral Economy,” published by the Department of Sociology, Lancaster 
University, at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/sayer-moral-economy.pdf. 
 23
Singh, A., J. Glen, A. Zammit, R. De-Hoyos, A. Singh and B. Weisse (2005) “Shareholder 
Value Maximisation, Stock Market and New Technology: Should the US Corporate 
Model be the Universal Standard?”, International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 19, 
No. 4, pp. 419–437. 
Wolfensohn, J.D. (1999) ‘A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework’, Memo 
to the Board, Management and Staff of the World Bank Group, 21 January. 
Wood, E.M. (1995) Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank (1995) World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2002) World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
GDS RESEARCH SERIES 
WORKING PAPERS: 
 
No. 1. Bonn Juego: Constitutionalizing “Authoritarian Liberalism” in the Philippines: A Critique of the 
Political Economy of Charter Change, 23 pp, 2008. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
